Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 30, Issue 2, February 2000, Pages 228-247
Games and Economic Behavior

Regular Article
Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy

https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0725Get rights and content

Abstract

We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer's strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the bound η(n), a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition η(n)/n  γ (n  ∞), then the maxmin value Wn(η(n)) converges to (cav U)(γ), the concavification of the maxmin value of the stage game in which the maximizer's actions are restricted to those with entropy at most γ. A similar result is obtained for the infinitely repeated games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C72.

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