Access to Deductive Logic Depends on a Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Area Devoted to Emotion and Feeling: Evidence from a Training Paradigm

doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0930

NeuroImage

Volume 14, Issue 6, December 2001, Pages 1486-1492

https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2001.0930 Get rights and content

Abstract

Doesthe human capacity for access to deductive logic depend on emotion and feeling? With positron emission tomography, we compared the brain networks recruited by two groups of subjects who were either able or not able to shift from errors to logical responses in a deductive reasoning task. They were scanned twice while performing the same task, before and after a training session. The error-to-logical shift occurred in a group that underwent logicoemotional training but not in the other group, trained in logic only—a “cold” kind of training. The intergroup comparison pointed out that access to deductive logic involved a right ventromedial prefrontal area known to be devoted to emotion and feeling.

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¹: To whom correspondence should be adressed at Groupe d'Imagerie Neurofonctionnelle (UMR 6095), Université Paris 5, Sorbonne, 46 Rue Saint-Jacques, 75005 Paris, France. Fax: 33 (0) 1 40 46 29 93. E-mail: [email protected].

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Rapid CommunicationAccess to Deductive Logic Depends on a Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Area Devoted to Emotion and Feeling: Evidence from a Training Paradigm

Abstract

Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex

Nat. Neurosci.

Dissociation of working memory from decision making within the human prefrontal cortex

J. Neurosci.

Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy

Science

Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior cingulate cortex

Trends Cognit. Sci.

Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online monitoring of performance

Science

Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain

The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness

The return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient

Science

Interference and Inhibition in Cognition

Rules for the Direction of the Mind

Prefrontal cortical contributions to working memory: Evidence from event-related fMRI studies

Exp. Brain Res.

Reasoning with negatives

Br. J. Psychol.

Biases in Human Reasoning

Matching bias in conditional reasoning

Thinking Reasoning

Spatial registration and normalization of images

Hum. Brain Mapp.

The seats of reason? An imaging study of deductive and inductive reasoning

NeuroReport

Rapid Communication
Access to Deductive Logic Depends on a Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Area Devoted to Emotion and Feeling: Evidence from a Training Paradigm