Fail-stop signatures are digital signatures where signers enjoy unconditional unforgeability (with an unavoidable but negligible error probability), while the verifiers bear the risk of forged signatures, and therefore enjoy computational security only. If a signer is confronted with an alleged signature that she has not produced, then the signer can with overwhelming probability prove that the alleged signature is in fact forged. Afterwards, the signer can revoke her verifying key, thus the name fail-stop signature scheme. Fail-stop signatures were introduced by Pfitzmann [4] who gives an in-depth introduction in [6]. The security for the signer is strictly stronger than the strongest security defined by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest (see GMR signatures [2]), where signers enjoy computational security while verifiers are unconditionally secure against forgery. In other words, the signer is secure even against counterfeiting by a computationally unrestricted attacker. In the same...
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References
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Bleumer, G. (2005). Fail-Stop Signature. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA . https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23483-7_154
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