The DC-Network is a synchronous network protocol by which the participants can broadcast messages anonymously and unobservably (see anonymity). A DC-Network can achieve sender and recipient anonymity even against computationally unrestricted attackers. The DC-Network protocol itself requires a network with a broadcast service. It was invented by David Chaum in 1984 [2, 3, 4] (hence the name DC-Network) and was somewhat re-discovered by Dolev and Ostrovsky in [5]. Messages can be addressed to one or more intended participants by encrypting them with their respective public encryption keys.
The basic DC-Network protocol allows one participant at a time to broadcast a message. In order to allow each participant to send at any time, the broadcast channel of the basic DC-Network needs to be allocated in a randomized fashion to all requesting senders. This can be achieved by well known contention protocols such as (slotted) ALOHA [8].
Consider the basic DC-Network protocol of n...
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Bleumer, G. (2005). DC Network. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA . https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23483-7_97
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