Abstract
A bargaining agent exchanges proposals, supported by claims, with an opponent. Each proposal and claim exchanged reveals valuable information about the sender’s position. A negotiation may break down if an agent believes that its opponent is not playing fairly. The agent aims to give the impression of fair play by responding with comparable information revelation whilst playing strategically to influence its opponent’s preferences with claims. The agent makes no assumptions about the internals of its opponent, including her motivations, logic, and whether she is conscious of a utility function. It focusses only on the information in the signals that it receives. It uses maximum entropy probabilistic reasoning to estimate unknown values in probability distributions including the probability that its opponent will accept any deal.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Debenham, J. (2005). A Bargaining Agent aims to ‘Play Fair’. In: Bramer, M., Coenen, F., Allen, T. (eds) Research and Development in Intelligent Systems XXI. SGAI 2004. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-84628-102-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-84628-102-4_13
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-85233-907-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-84628-102-0
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