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International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce

AMEC 1999: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce II pp 131–152Cite as

Resource Allocation Using Sequential Auctions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1788))

Abstract

Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and multiagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, one generally relies on combinatorial auctions where agents bid for resource bundles, or simultaneous auctions for all resources. We develop a different model, where agents bid for required resources sequentially. This model has the advantage that it can be applied in settings where combinatorial and simultaneous models are infeasible (e.g., when resources are made available at different points in time by different parties), as well as certain benefits in settings where combinatorial models are applicable. We develop a dynamic programming model for agents to compute bidding policies based on estimated distributions over prices. We also describe how these distributions are updated to provide a learning model for bidding behavior.

Parts of this paper appeared in C. Boutilier, M. Goldszmidt, B. Sabata, “Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities,” Proc. Sixteenth Intl. Joint Conf. on AI, Stockholm, pp.527-534 (1999).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S 3H5, Canada

    Craig Boutilier

  2. Dept. of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Moisés Goldszmidt, Claire Monteleoni & Bikash Sabata

Authors
  1. Craig Boutilier
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  2. Moisés Goldszmidt
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  3. Claire Monteleoni
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  4. Bikash Sabata
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MIT Media Laboratory, MA 02139, Cambridge, USA

    Alexandros Moukas

  2. Enersearch AB and Computing Science Department, Information Technology Uppsala University, Chalmers Science Park, SE - 412 88, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Fredrik Ygge

  3. Institut d’Investigació en Intel·ligència Artificial, Barcelona, Spain

    Carles Sierra

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Boutilier, C., Goldszmidt, M., Monteleoni, C., Sabata, B. (2000). Resource Allocation Using Sequential Auctions. In: Moukas, A., Ygge, F., Sierra, C. (eds) Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce II. AMEC 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1788. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10720026_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10720026_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67773-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44982-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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