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Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1831))

Abstract

On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting and on tree automata techniques. Protocols are operationally described using Term Rewriting Systems and the initial set of communication requests is described by a tree automaton. Starting from these two representations, we automatically compute an over-approximation of the set of exchanged messages (also recognized by a tree automaton). Then, proving classical properties like confidentiality or authentication can be done by automatically showing that the intersection between the approximation and a set of prohibited behaviors is the empty set. Furthermore, this method enjoys a simple and powerful way to describe intruder work, the ability to consider an unbounded number of parties, an unbounded number of interleaved sessions, and a theoretical property ensuring safeness of the approximation.

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Genet, T., Klay, F. (2000). Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In: McAllester, D. (eds) Automated Deduction - CADE-17. CADE 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1831. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10721959_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10721959_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67664-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45101-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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