Abstract
It is wel-known that Nash considered the n-person noncooperative game with each player having finite strategic set and proved the celebrated existence result of Nash equilibrium point (in mixed strategies). This paper investigates the n-person noncooperative game with each player having infinite strategic set. By considering these infinite strategic as complete metric spaces and based on a new finite equilibrium system, we obtain new existence result of Nash equilibrium. Then an algorithm is given to compute Nash equilibrium points and its convergence is proved.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Yu, H., Chen, J., Sun, C. (2005). N-Person Noncooperative Game with Infinite Strategic Space. In: Megiddo, N., Xu, Y., Zhu, B. (eds) Algorithmic Applications in Management. AAIM 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3521. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11496199_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496199_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26224-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32440-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)