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On the Success Probability of χ 2-attack on RC6

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3574))

Abstract

Knudsen and Meier applied the χ 2-attack to RC6. The χ 2-attack can be used for both distinguishing attacks and key recovery attacks. Up to the present, the success probability of key recovery attack in any χ 2-attack has not been evaluated theoretically without any assumption of experimental results. In this paper, we discuss the success probability of key recovery attack in χ 2-attack and give the theorem that evaluates the success probability of a key recovery attack without any assumption of experimental approximation, for the first time. We make sure the accuracy of our theorem by demonstrating it on both 4-round RC6 without post-whitening and 4-round RC6-8. We also evaluate the security of RC6 theoretically and show that a variant of the χ 2-attack is faster than an exhaustive key search for the 192-bit-key and 256-bit-key RC6 with up to 16 rounds. As a result, we succeed in answering such an open question that a variant of the χ 2-attack can be used to attack RC6 with 16 or more rounds.

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Miyaji, A., Takano, Y. (2005). On the Success Probability of χ 2-attack on RC6. In: Boyd, C., González Nieto, J.M. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3574. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11506157_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11506157_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26547-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31684-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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