Abstract
In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The first one uses a fault model that induces a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result, hence allowing us to obtain the key by using 50 faulty ciphertexts for an AES-128. The second attack uses a more realistic fault model: we assume that we may induce a fault on a whole byte. For an AES-128, this second attack provides the key by using less than 250 faulty ciphertexts.
If we extend our hypothesis by supposing that the attacker can choose the byte affected by the fault, our bit-fault attack requires 35 faulty ciphertexts to obtain the secret key and our byte-fault attack requires only 31 faulty ciphertexts.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Anderson, R., Kuhn, M.: Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note. In: Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, pp. 1–11 (1996)
Anderson, R., Kuhn, M.: Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Mark, T., Lomas, A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 1997. LNCS, vol. 1361, pp. 125–136. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Biehl, I., Meyer, B., Müller, V.: Differential Fault Analysis on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 131–146. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystem. In: Kalisky Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 513–525. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Blömer, J., Seifert, J.-P.: Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard. In: Wright, R.N. (ed.) FC 2003. LNCS, vol. 2742, pp. 162–181. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 37–51. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Ciet, M., Joye, M.: Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems in the Presence of Permanent and Transient Faults. In: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (2004) (to appear)
Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The Design of Rijndael. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Lenstra, A.K.: Memo on RSA Signature Generation in the Presence of Faults (manuscript) (1996), Available from the author at, akl@Lucent.com
Maher, D.P.: Fault Induction Attacks, Tamper Resistance, and Hostile Reverse Engineering in Perspective. In: Hirschfeld, R. (ed.) Financial Cryptography – FC 1997. LNCS, vol. 1318, pp. 109–121. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS PUB 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (2001)
Piret, G., Quisquater, J.-J.: A Differential Fault Attack Technique Against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES and Khazad. In: Walter, C.D., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2003. LNCS, vol. 2779, pp. 77–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Skorobogatov, S., Anderson, R.: Optical Fault Induction Attack. In: Kaliski Jr., B., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 2–12. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Giraud, C. (2005). DFA on AES. In: Dobbertin, H., Rijmen, V., Sowa, A. (eds) Advanced Encryption Standard – AES. AES 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3373. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11506447_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11506447_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26557-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31840-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)