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Unwinding Conditions for Security in Imperative Languages

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3573))

Abstract

We study unwinding conditions for the definition of non-interference properties of a simple imperative language, admitting parallel executions on a shared memory. We present different classes of programs obtained by instantiating a general unwinding framework and show that all the programs in these classes satisfy the non-interference principle. Moreover, we introduce a subclass of secure programs which is compositional with respect to the language constructors and we discuss verification techniques.

This work has been partially supported by the EU Contract IST-2001-32617 and the FIRB project RBAU018RCZ.

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Bossi, A., Piazza, C., Rossi, S. (2005). Unwinding Conditions for Security in Imperative Languages. In: Etalle, S. (eds) Logic Based Program Synthesis and Transformation. LOPSTR 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3573. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11506676_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11506676_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26655-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31683-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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