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Automatic Detection of Attacks on Cryptographic Protocols: A Case Study

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Book cover Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3548))

Abstract

Recently, a new verification tool for cryptographic protocols called S3A (Spi Calculus Specifications Symbolic Analyzer) has been developed, which is based on exhaustive state space exploration and symbolic data representation, and overcomes most of the limitations of previously available tools.

In this paper we present some insights on the ability of S3A to detect complex type flaw attacks, using a weakened version of the well-known Yahalom authentication protocol as a case study. The nature of the attack found by S3A makes it very difficult to spot by hand, thus showing the usefulness of analyis tools of this kind in real-world protocol analysis.

This work was developed in the framework of the CNR project “Metodi e strumenti per la progettazione di sistemi software-intensive ad elevata complessità”.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IEIIT – CNR,  

    Ivan Cibrario B., Luca Durante & Adriano Valenzano

  2. Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica, Politecnico di Torino, C.so Duca degli Abruzzi 24, I-10129, Torino, Italy

    Riccardo Sisto

Authors
  1. Ivan Cibrario B.
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  2. Luca Durante
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  3. Riccardo Sisto
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  4. Adriano Valenzano
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Research GmbH, Säumerstr. 4, 8803, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Klaus Julisch

  2. Secure Systems Lab, Technical University of Vienna, 1040, Vienna, Austria

    Christopher Kruegel

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cibrario B., I., Durante, L., Sisto, R., Valenzano, A. (2005). Automatic Detection of Attacks on Cryptographic Protocols: A Case Study. In: Julisch, K., Kruegel, C. (eds) Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3548. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11506881_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11506881_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26613-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31645-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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