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European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty

ECSQARU 2005: Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty pp 15–26Cite as

Some Representation and Computational Issues in Social Choice

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3571))

Abstract

This paper briefly considers several research issues, some of which are on-going and some others are for further research. The starting point is that many AI topics, especially those related to the ECSQARU and KR conferences, can bring a lot to the representation and the resolution of social choice problems. I surely do not claim to make an exhaustive list of problems, but I rather list some problems that I find important, give some relevant references and point out some potential research issues.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IRIT – Université Paul Sabatier and CNRS, 31062, Toulouse Cedex, France

    Jérôme Lang

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  1. Jérôme Lang
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IIIA - CSIC, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain

    Lluís Godo

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lang, J. (2005). Some Representation and Computational Issues in Social Choice. In: Godo, L. (eds) Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty. ECSQARU 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3571. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11518655_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11518655_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-27326-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31888-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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