Abstract
Anonymity technologies have gained more and more attention for communication privacy. In general, users obtain anonymity at a certain cost in an anonymous communication system, which uses rerouting to increase the system’s robustness. However, a long rerouting path incurs large overhead and decreases the quality of service (QoS). In this paper, we propose the Scalar Anonymity System (SAS) in order to provide a tradeoff between anonymity and cost for different users with different requirements. In SAS, by selecting the level of anonymity, a user obtains the corresponding anonymity and QoS and also sustains the corresponding load of traffic rerouting for other users. Our theoretical analysis and simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of SAS.
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Xu, H., Fu, X., Zhu, Y., Bettati, R., Chen, J., Zhao, W. (2005). SAS: A Scalar Anonymous Communication System. In: Lu, X., Zhao, W. (eds) Networking and Mobile Computing. ICCNMC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3619. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11534310_49
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11534310_49
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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