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Modeling for Security Verification of a Cryptographic Protocol with MAC Payload

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Book cover Advances in Intelligent Computing (ICIC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3645))

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Abstract

We propose a new sub-term relation to specify syntax of messages with MAC (Message Authentication Code) payload for the cryptographic protocols in the strand space model. The sub-term relation was introduced to formal analysis of cryptographic protocols based on theorem proving, but some defects have been found in it. In the present paper, first, the operatorf is defined to the extend sub-term relation, which is used to amend its original flaws. Second, a new ideal is constructed, and is used to expand the bounds on the penetrator’s abilities. Third, the decidable theorem for honesty of ideals holds as it is described under the extended sub-term relation is proved. Fourth, we propose the theorem of the satisfiability for decidable conditions of honest ideals and annotate how invariant-sets generate, which is used to verify security properties of cryptographic protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science & Information Technology, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei Anhui, 230009, China

    Huanbao Wang, Yousheng Zhang & Yuan Li

Authors
  1. Huanbao Wang
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  2. Yousheng Zhang
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  3. Yuan Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Intelligent Computing Lab, Institute of Intelligent Machines, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China

    De-Shuang Huang

  2. School of Computer & Information Technology, Beijing Jiaotong University, 100044, Beijing, P.R. China

    Xiao-Ping Zhang

  3. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    Guang-Bin Huang

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Wang, H., Zhang, Y., Li, Y. (2005). Modeling for Security Verification of a Cryptographic Protocol with MAC Payload. In: Huang, DS., Zhang, XP., Huang, GB. (eds) Advances in Intelligent Computing. ICIC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3645. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11538356_56

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11538356_56

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28227-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31907-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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