Abstract
I’d like to be able to offer some guarantees of access in spite of flooding attacks in distributed denial of service instances. This is a topic that has interested me for a number of years, and hopefully I have now got a handle on it.
In large open networks, in which all clients are legitimately authorised access to a particular service – regardless of their speed, or their location, or any other attributes – we’d obviously like to have client registration and authentication become unnecessary for service access. Of course, authentication might be necessary to control access to certain objects within the particular service, but that has nothing to do with whether or not the client can actually address or access the service.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gligor, V.D. (2005). Guaranteeing Access in Spite of Distributed Service-Flooding Attacks. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3364. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11542322_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11542322_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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