Abstract
Security protocols are moving from the network and transport layers into application layers to adapt on one hand to new paradigms in distributed applications, and to achieve on the other hand higher level security properties such as intrusion tolerance. We argue that these new protocols ensuring, for instance, intrusion tolerance can be built with the same building blocks as traditional protocols ensuring confidentiality, authentication, nonrepudiation, fair exchange, and anonymity, but need to integrate additional application-specific requirements. This calls for a new design approach where both application and security requirements are refined simultaneously. Our approach, called protocol codesign, achieves this goal by providing a rigorous methodology for designing protocols based on the composition of basic services.
This research was partially supported by DARPA/AFRL contract F30602-00-C-0087 and NSF contract CCR-0325274.
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Saïdi, H., Stavridou, V., Duterte, B. (2005). Protocol Codesign. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3364. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11542322_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11542322_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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