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Justifying a Dolev-Yao Model Under Active Attacks

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Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III (FOSAD 2005, FOSAD 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3655))

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Abstract

We present the first idealized cryptographic library that can be used like the Dolev-Yao model for automated proofs of cryptographic protocols that use nested cryptographic operations, while coming with a cryptographic implementation that is provably secure under active attacks.

To illustrate the usefulness of the cryptographic library, we present a cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol for entity authentication. This protocol was previously only proved over unfounded abstractions from cryptography. We show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using standard provably secure cryptographic primitives. Conducting the proof by means of the idealized cryptographic library does not require us to deal with the probabilistic aspects of cryptography, hence the proof is in the scope of current automated proof tools. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, this exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and paves the way for the cryptographically sound verification of security protocols by automated proof tools.

Parts of this work appeared in Proc. 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security [12] and Proc. 23rd Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science [7].

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  1. IBM Zurich Research Lab,  

    Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann & Michael Waidner

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  1. Michael Backes
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  2. Birgit Pfitzmann
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  3. Michael Waidner
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie dell’Informazione, Università degli Studi di Urbino “Carlo Bo”, Piazza della Repubblica 13, 61029, Urbino, Italy

    Alessandro Aldini

  2. Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Informazione, Università di Bologna, Mura A. Zamboni, 7, 40127, Bologna, Italy

    Roberto Gorrieri

  3. IIT CNR, Pisa, via Moruzzi, 1, 56125, Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

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Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M. (2005). Justifying a Dolev-Yao Model Under Active Attacks. In: Aldini, A., Gorrieri, R., Martinelli, F. (eds) Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III. FOSAD FOSAD 2005 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3655. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11554578_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11554578_1

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