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Insider Impersonation-MIM Attack to Tripartite Key Agreement Scheme and an Efficient Protocol for Multiple Keys

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Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3802))

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the definition of insiderimpersonation -MIM attack for tripartite key agreement schemes and show that almost all of the proposed schemes are not secure under this attack. We present a new protocol which is much more efficient than the existential secure protocol [13] in terms of computational efficiency and transmitted data size. Moreover, our protocol is the first scheme for multiple keys which means that not only a large number of keys but also various kinds of keys can be generated by applying our scheme.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8573, Japan

    Lihua Wang, Takeshi Okamoto & Eiji Okamoto

  2. School of Systems Information Science, Future University-Hakodate, 116-2 Kamedanakano-cho, Hakodate, Hokkaido, 041-8655, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

Authors
  1. Lihua Wang
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  2. Takeshi Okamoto
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  3. Tsuyoshi Takagi
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  4. Eiji Okamoto
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microelectronic Instiute, Xidian University, 710071, Xi’an, China

    Yue Hao

  2. Department of Computer Science, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

    Jiming Liu

  3. School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi’an, China

    Yu-Ping Wang

  4. Department of Computer Science, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong,  

    Yiu-ming Cheung

  5. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Manchester, UK

    Hujun Yin

  6. Life Science Research Center, School of Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, 710071, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China

    Licheng Jiao

  7. Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Security(Ministry of Education), Xidian University, 710071, Xi’an, China

    Jianfeng Ma

  8. National Laboratory of Antennas and Microwave Technology, Xidian University, 710071, Xi’an, Shanxi, P.R. China

    Yong-Chang Jiao

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cite this paper

Wang, L., Okamoto, T., Takagi, T., Okamoto, E. (2005). Insider Impersonation-MIM Attack to Tripartite Key Agreement Scheme and an Efficient Protocol for Multiple Keys. In: Hao, Y., et al. Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30819-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31598-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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