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On the Security of Condorcet Electronic Voting Scheme

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Book cover Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3802))

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Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the Condorcet voting scheme in which each voter votes with the full order of the candidates according to preference, and the result of the election is determined by one-on-one comparisons between each candidate. We propose the Condorcet electronic voting scheme that is secure, universally verifiable and satisfying one-on-one comparison privacy. Furthermore the result of the election can be determined without revealing the order of the candidates which each voter specified. We use a matrix to represent the order of all the candidates according to preference, and satisfy one-on-one comparison privacy using homomorphic property.

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Lee, Y.C., Doi, H. (2005). On the Security of Condorcet Electronic Voting Scheme. In: Hao, Y., et al. Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30819-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31598-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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