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An Improvement on Strong-Password Authentication Protocols

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Abstract

Password authentication schemes can be divided into two types. One requires the easy-to-remember password, and the other requires the strong password. In 2000, Sandirigama et al. proposed a simple and secure password authentication protocol (SAS). Then, Lin et al. showed that SAS suffers from two weaknesses and proposed an improvement (OSPA) in 2001. However, Chen and Ku pointed out that both SAS and OSPA are vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack. We also find that these two protocols lack the property of mutual authentication. Hence, we propose an improvement of SAS and OSPA to defend against the stolen-verifier attack and provide mutual authentication in this paper.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chang, YF., Chang, CC. (2005). An Improvement on Strong-Password Authentication Protocols. In: Yang, L.T., Zhou, X., Zhao, W., Wu, Z., Zhu, Y., Lin, M. (eds) Embedded Software and Systems. ICESS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3820. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11599555_60

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11599555_60

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30881-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32297-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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