Abstract
A Bayesian communication in the p-belief system is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through messages as a Bayesian updating process. In the communication process each player predicts the other players’ actions under his/her private information with probability at least his/her belief. The players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the communication graph, where each player receiving the message learns and revises his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that both any topological assumptions on the communication graph and any common-knowledge assumptions on the structure of communication are not required.
This paper is submitted for possible presentation in WINE 2005, 15-17 December 2005, Hong Kong, China.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aumann, R.J., Brandenburger, A.: Epistemic conditions for mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 63, 1161–1180 (1995)
Kalai, E., Lehrer, E.: Rational learning to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61, 1019–1045 (1993)
Ishikawa, R.: Consensus by passionate communication, Working paper, Hitotsubashi Discussion Paper Series 2003-6 (2003), http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~kenkyu/jpn/pub/dp-abstract.htm#0306/
Matsuhisa, T.: Communication leading to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium I. In: Maruyama, T. (ed.) Mathematical Economics, Suri-Kaiseki-Kenkyusyo Kokyuroku, vol. 1165, pp. 245–256 (2000)
Matsuhisa, T.: Communication leading to epsilon-mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Working paper (2001); The extended abstract was presented in the XIV Italian Meeting of Game Theory and Applications (IMGTA XIV), July 11-14 (2001)
Monderer, D., Samet, D.: Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs. Games and Economic Behaviors 1, 170–190 (1989)
Nash, J.F.: Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36, 48–49 (1950)
Parikh, R., Krasucki, P.: Communication, consensus, and knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 178–189 (1990)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Matsuhisa, T., Strokan, P. (2005). Bayesian Communication Leading to a Nash Equilibrium in Belief. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)