Abstract
The Ha-Moon algorithm [4] is a countermeasure against power analysis using a randomized addition chain. It has two drawbacks in that it requires an inversion and has a right-to-left approach. Recently, Yen et al. improved the algorithm by removing these drawbacks [11]. Their new algorithm is inversion-free, has a left-to-right approach, and employs a window method. They insisted that their algorithm leads to a more secure countermeasure in computing modular exponentiation against side-channel attacks. This algorithm, however, still has a similar weakness observed in [2, 10]. This paper shows that the improved Ha-Moon algorithm is vulnerable to differential power analysis even if we employ their method in selecting s i .
This research was supported by University IT Research Center Project, the Brain Korea 21 Project.
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Shin, J.H., Park, D.J., Lee, P.J. (2006). DPA Attack on the Improved Ha-Moon Algorithm. In: Song, JS., Kwon, T., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3786. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11604938_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11604938_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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