Abstract
A traveling salesman game is a cooperative game \(\mathcal{G} = (N, c_{D})\). Here N, the set of players is the set of cities (or the vertices of the complete graph) and c D is the characteristic function where D is the underlying cost matrix. For all S ⊆ N, define c D (S) to be the cost of a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour through the vertices of S∪ {0} where 0 ∉ N is called as the home city. Define Core \((\mathcal{G})= \{x \in \Re^{N} :x(N) = c_{D}(N)\ {\rm and}\ \forall S\subseteq N, x(S) \leq c_{D} (S)n\} \) as the core of a traveling salesman game (\(\mathcal{G}\)). Okamoto [15] conjectured that for the traveling salesman game \(\mathcal{G} = (N, c_{D})\) with D satisfying triangle inequality, the problem of testing whether Core (\(\mathcal{G}\)) is empty or not is NP–hard. We prove that this conjecture is true. This result directly implies the NP–hardness for the general case when D is asymmetric. We also study approximate fair cost allocations for these games. For this, we introduce the cycle cover games and show that the core of a cycle cover game is non–empty by finding a fair cost allocation vector in polynomial time. For a traveling salesman game, let \(\epsilon-{\rm Core} (\mathcal{G})=\{x \in \Re^{N} :x(N) = c_{D}(N) {\rm and}\ \forall S\subseteq N, x(S) \leq {\epsilon}\cdot c_{D}(S)\}\) be an ε–approximate core, for a given ε > 1. By viewing an approximate fair cost allocation vector for this game as a sum of exact fair cost allocation vectors of several related cycle cover games, we provide a polynomial time algorithm demonstrating the non–emptiness of the log2(|N|–1)– approximate core by exhibiting a vector in this approximate core for the asymmetric traveling salesman game. We also show that there exists an ε 0 > 1 such that it is NP–hard to decide whether ε 0–Core(\(\mathcal{G})\) is empty or not.
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Bläser, M., Ram, L.S. (2006). Approximate Fair Cost Allocation in Metric Traveling Salesman Games. In: Erlebach, T., Persinao, G. (eds) Approximation and Online Algorithms. WAOA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3879. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11671411_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11671411_7
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