Abstract
We study the following problem in a sovereign information-sharing setting: How to ensure that the individual participants, driven solely by self-interest, will behave honestly, even though they can benefit from cheating. This benefit comes from learning more than necessary private information of others or from preventing others from learning the necessary information. We take a game-theoretic approach and design a game (strategies and payoffs) that models this kind of interactions. We show that if nobody is punished for cheating, rational participants will not behave honestly. Observing this, our game includes an auditing device that periodically checks the actions of the participants and penalizes inappropriate behavior. In this game we give conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium (stable rational behavior) in which every participant provides truthful information. The auditing device preserves the privacy of the data of the individual participants. We also quantify the relationship between the frequency of auditing and the amount of punishment in terms of gains and losses from cheating.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Agrawal, R., Evfimievski, A.V., Srikant, R.: Information sharing across private databases. In: SIGMOD (2003)
Clarke, D., Devadas, S., van Dijk, M., Gassend, B., Suh, G.E.: Incremental multiset hash functions and their application to memory integrity checking. In: Laih, C.-S. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2894, pp. 188–207. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Clifton, C., Kantarcioglu, M., Lin, X., Vaidya, J., Zhu, M.: Tools for privacy preserving distributed data mining. SIGKDD Explorations 4(2), 28–34 (2003)
Ferguson, T., Melolidakis, C.: On the inspection game. Naval Research Logistics 45 (1998)
Ferguson, T., Melolidakis, C.: Games with finite resources. International Journal on Game Theory 29 (2000)
Freedman, M.J., Nissim, K., Pinkas, B.: Efficient private matching and set intersection. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography, volume 2: Basic Applications, May 2004. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)
Huberman, B.A., Franklin, M., Hogg, T.: Enhancing privacy and trust in electronic communities. In: Proc. of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Denver, Colorado (November 1999)
Corporation, I.B.M.: IBM 4758 Models 2 and 23 PCI cryptographic coprocessor (2004)
Kearns, M., Ortiz, L.E.: Algorithms for interdependent security games. In: NIPS (2004)
Kearns, M.J., Mansour, Y.: Efficient Nash computation in large population games with bounded influence. In: UAI (2002)
Kleinberg, J., Papadimitriou, C., Raghavan, P.: On the value of private information. In: 8th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (2001)
Kunreuther, H., Heal, G.: Interdependent security. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (2002)
Maschler, M.: A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constantsum game. Princeton econometric research program (1963)
Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996)
Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Efficient oblivious transfer protocols. In: Proc. of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Washington DC, USA, pp. 448–457 (January 2001)
Osborne, M., Rubinstein, A.: A course in game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
Rogaway, P., Bellare, M., Black, J.: OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 6(3), 365–403 (2003)
Rosenthal, R.W.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory (1973)
Vila, T., Greenstadt, R., Molnar, D.: Why we can’t be bothered to read privacy policies: Models of privacy economics as a lemons market. In: Second International Workshop on Economics and Information Security (2003)
von Stengel, B.: Recursive inspection games. Technical Report S-9106, University of the Federal Armed Forces, Munich (1991)
Zhang, N., Zhao, W.: Distributed privacy preserving information sharing. In: VLDB (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Agrawal, R., Terzi, E. (2006). On Honesty in Sovereign Information Sharing. In: Ioannidis, Y., et al. Advances in Database Technology - EDBT 2006. EDBT 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3896. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11687238_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11687238_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-32960-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32961-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)