Abstract
There is an extensive body of literature concerning optimal bidding strategies for agents participating in single shot auctions for single, individually valued goods. However, it remains a largely open question how a bidder should formulate his bidding strategy when there is a sequence of auctions and, furthermore, there are complementarities in the valuation for the bundle of items acquired in the separate auctions. We investigate conditions for which adjusting the bidding horizon beyond the immediate auction is profitable for a bidder. We show how such a strategy, in the limit, reduces agents to zero marginal profits as predicted by the Bertrand economic theory. We support our experimental results by drawing a parallel to the nIPD.
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Hoen, P.J.’., La Poutré, J.A. (2006). Repeated Auctions with Complementarities. In: La Poutré, H., Sadeh, N.M., Janson, S. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms. AMEC TADA 2005 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3937. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-46242-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46243-9
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