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International Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography

FDTC 2006: Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography pp 106–120Cite as

Fault Based Collision Attacks on AES

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4236))

Abstract

In this paper we present a new class of collision attacks that are based on inducing faults into the encryption process. We combine the classical fault attack of Biham and Shamir with the concept of collision attacks of Schramm et al. Unlike previous fault attacks by Blömer and Seifert our new attacks only need bit flips not bit resets. Furthermore, the new attacks do not need the faulty ciphertext to derive the secret key. We only need the weaker information whether a collision has occurred or not. This is an improvement over previous attacks presented for example by Dusart, Letourneux and Vivolo, Giraud, Chen and Yen or Piret and Quisquater. As it turns out the new attacks are very powerful even against sophisticated countermeasures like error detection and memory encryption.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, Germany

    Johannes Blömer & Volker Krummel

Authors
  1. Johannes Blömer
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  2. Volker Krummel
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy

    Luca Breveglieri

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

    Israel Koren

  3. École normale supérieure, Équipe de cryptographie, 45 rue d’Ulm, F-75230, Paris cedex 05, France

    David Naccache

  4. Institute for Computer Science, University of Innsbruck, 6020, Innsbruck, Austria

    Jean-Pierre Seifert

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Blömer, J., Krummel, V. (2006). Fault Based Collision Attacks on AES. In: Breveglieri, L., Koren, I., Naccache, D., Seifert, JP. (eds) Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography. FDTC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4236. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-46250-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46251-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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