Abstract
Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC and a European encryption standard by the NESSIE project. Wu Wenling presented the collision attack on reduced-round Camellia in 2004, the 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 210 chosen plaintexts and 215 encryptions. The improved collision attack on 6 rounds Camellia which based on four 4-round distinguishers is presented in this paper. This attack requires less than 210.6 chosen plaintexts and 211.5 encryptions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aoki, K., Ichikawa, T., Kanda, M.: Specification of Camellia - a 128-bit Block Cipher. In: Stinson, D.R., Tavares, S. (eds.) SAC 2000. LNCS, vol. 2012, pp. 183–191. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Wu, W.L., Feng, D.G.: Collision Attack on Reduced-Round Camellia. SCIENCE IN CHINA Ser. E Information Sciences 34, 857–868 (2004)
Hatano, Y., Sekine, H., Kaneko, T.: Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia(II). In: Nyberg, K., Heys, H.M. (eds.) SAC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2595, pp. 39–56. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Lee, S., Hong, S., Lim, J., et al.: Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis of Camellia. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) ICISC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2288, pp. 32–38. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Sugita, M., Kobara, K., Imai, H.: Security of reduced version of the block cipher Camellia against truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 193–207. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Shirai, T., Kanamaru, S., Abe, G.: Improved upper bounds of differential and linear characteristic probability for Camellia. In: Daemen, J., Rijmen, V. (eds.) FSE 2002. LNCS, vol. 2365, pp. 128–142. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
He, Y.P., Qing, S.H.: Square attack on Reduced Camellia Cipher. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds.) ICICS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2229, pp. 238–245. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Yeom, Y., Park, S., Kim, I.: On the security of Camellia against the square attack. In: Daemen, J., Rijmen, V. (eds.) FSE 2002. LNCS, vol. 2365, pp. 89–99. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Yeom, Y., Park, S., Kim, I.: A study of Integral type cryptanalysis on Camellia. In: The 2003 Symposium on Cryptography and Security-SCIS 2003, pp. 26–29. Hamamatsu, Japan (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Jie, G., Zhongya, Z. (2006). Improved Collision Attack on Reduced Round Camellia. In: Pointcheval, D., Mu, Y., Chen, K. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4301. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11935070_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11935070_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-49462-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49463-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)