Abstract
Recently, there is an urge to allocate chunks of the spectrum to the wireless service providers on a more dynamic basis rather than the current practice of static allocation. This shift in paradigm is a result of many studies that indicate the improper utilization of the spectrum by the service providers due to the static spectrum assignment. Also, the use of the spectrum has been found to be space and time invariant. In this paper, we investigate the dynamic spectrum allocation policy for optimal use of the spectrum band. We propose a dynamic spectrum assignment strategy based on auction theory that captures the conflict of interest between wireless service providers and spectrum owner, both of whom try to maximize their respective benefits. We compare two different allocation strategies – synchronous and asynchronous. It is demonstrated that synchronous strategy outperforms the asynchronous strategy. Through simulation results, we show how the optimal usage of spectrum band is achieved along with the maximized revenue for spectrum owner and higher probability of winning spectrum for the service providers.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Sengupta, S., Chatterjee, M. (2006). Synchronous and Asynchronous Auction Models for Dynamic Spectrum Access. In: Chaudhuri, S., Das, S.R., Paul, H.S., Tirthapura, S. (eds) Distributed Computing and Networking. ICDCN 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4308. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11947950_61
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11947950_61
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68139-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68140-3
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