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Assessing the Risk of an Information Infrastructure Through Security Dependencies

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Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 4347))

Abstract

We outline a framework for the risk assessment of information infrastructures that generalizes the notion of dependency with respect to security attributes such as confidentiality, integrity or availability. Dependencies are used to model an infrastructure at distinct abstraction levels, to discover attack strategies and to define risk mitigation plans. A plan is formulated in terms of set of countermeasures because single countermeasures may be ineffective due to alternative threat attack strategies. We do not detail the assessment steps and focus on the integration of their results to define risk mitigation plans. Lastly, we discuss the development of programming tools to support the assessment.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Baiardi, F., Suin, S., Telmon, C., Pioli, M. (2006). Assessing the Risk of an Information Infrastructure Through Security Dependencies. In: Lopez, J. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4347. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11962977_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11962977_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69083-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69084-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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