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Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2513))

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Abstract

The sealed bid model of auctions is ideally suited for electronic auction systems, as they avoid the requirement for real-time communications between various entities. A sealed bid auction scheme designed by Kikuchi, Harkavy and Tygar is analysed. Several shortcomings are identified in this scheme including the lack of public verifiability and the possibility of collusion between bidders and/or auctioneers. A new scheme is designed to overcome these shortcomings.

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Peng, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Viswanathan, K. (2002). Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction. In: Deng, R., Bao, F., Zhou, J., Qing, S. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2513. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_13

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00164-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36159-6

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