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Typing One-to-One and One-to-Many Correspondences in Security Protocols

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Abstract

Both one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences between events, sometimes known as injective and non-injective agreements, respectively, are widely used to specify correctness properties of cryptographic protocols. In earlier work, we showed how to typecheck one-to-one correspondences for protocols expressed in the spi-calculus. We present a new type and e.ect system able to verify both one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, USA

    Andrew D. Gordon

  2. DePaul University, USA

    Alan Jefrey

Authors
  1. Andrew D. Gordon
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  2. Alan Jefrey
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minatoku, 108-8345, Tokyo, Japan

    Mitsuhiro Okada

  2. University of Pennsylvania, 200 South 33rd St., 19104, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Benjamin C. Pierce

  3. University of Pennsylvania, 209 South 33rd St., 19104-6395, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Andre Scedrov

  4. Keio University, 5322 Endoh, 252-8520, Fujisawa, Japan

    Hideyuki Tokuda

  5. University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, 113, Tokyo, Japan

    Akinori Yonezawa

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gordon, A.D., Jefrey, A. (2003). Typing One-to-One and One-to-Many Correspondences in Security Protocols. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds) Software Security — Theories and Systems. ISSS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2609. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00708-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36532-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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