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International Symposium on Software Security

ISSS 2002: Software Security — Theories and Systems pp 339–355Cite as

Environmental Requirements for Authentication Protocols

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2609))

Abstract

Most work on requirements in the area of authentication protocols has concentrated on identifying requirements for the protocol without much consideration of context. Little work has concentrated on assumptions about the environment, for example, the applications that make use of authenticated keys. We will show in this paper how the interaction between a protocol and its environment can have a major effect on a protocol. Specifically we will demonstrate a number of attacks on published and/or widely used protocols that are not feasible against the protocol running in isolation (even with multiple runs) but become feasible in some application environments. We will also discuss the tradeo. between putting constraints on a protocol and putting constraints on the environment in which it operates.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, POB 704, 10598, Yorktown Heights, NY

    Ran Canetti

  2. Naval Research Laboratory, Center for High Assurance Computer Systems, DC 20375, Washington

    Catherine Meadows & Paul Syverson

Authors
  1. Ran Canetti
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  2. Catherine Meadows
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  3. Paul Syverson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minatoku, 108-8345, Tokyo, Japan

    Mitsuhiro Okada

  2. University of Pennsylvania, 200 South 33rd St., 19104, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Benjamin C. Pierce

  3. University of Pennsylvania, 209 South 33rd St., 19104-6395, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Andre Scedrov

  4. Keio University, 5322 Endoh, 252-8520, Fujisawa, Japan

    Hideyuki Tokuda

  5. University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, 113, Tokyo, Japan

    Akinori Yonezawa

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Canetti, R., Meadows, C., Syverson, P. (2003). Environmental Requirements for Authentication Protocols. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds) Software Security — Theories and Systems. ISSS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2609. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_21

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00708-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36532-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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