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Evaluating Reputation in Multi-agents Systems

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Trust, Reputation, and Security: Theories and Practice (TRUST 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2631))

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Abstract

Reputation has recently received considerable attention within a number of disciplines such as distributed artificial intelligence, economics, evolutionary biology, among others. Most papers about reputation provide an intuitive approach to reputation which appeals to common experiences without clarifying whether their use of reputation is similar or different from those used by others. This paper argues that reputation is not a single notion but one with multiple parts. After a survey of existing works on reputation, an intuitive typology is proposed summarizing existing works on reputation across diverse disciplines. This paper then describes a simple simulation framework based on evolutionary game theory for understanding the relative strength of the different notions of reputation. Whereas these notions of reputation could only be compared qualitatively before, our simulation framework has enabled us to compare them quantitatively.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

    Lik Mui & Mojdeh Mohtashemi

  2. Magiccookie, 9 Whittemore Road, Newton, MA, 02458, USA

    Ari Halberstadt

Authors
  1. Lik Mui
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  2. Ari Halberstadt
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  3. Mojdeh Mohtashemi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, Group of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive and Interacting Modelling, National Research Council, Viale Marx 15, 00137, Rome, Italy

    Rino Falcone

  2. Electrical and Computer Engineering, The Laboratory for Intelligent Processes and Systems Austin, University of Texas at Austin, TX, 78712, USA

    Suzanne Barber

  3. Institute for Information Technology, Network Computing Group, National Research Council, 1200 Montreal Road, Building M-50, Ottawa, ON, K1A 0R6, Canada

    Larry Korba

  4. Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, 940 Main Campus Drive, Suite 110, Raleigh, NC, 27606, USA

    Munindar Singh

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Mui, L., Halberstadt, A., Mohtashemi, M. (2003). Evaluating Reputation in Multi-agents Systems. In: Falcone, R., Barber, S., Korba, L., Singh, M. (eds) Trust, Reputation, and Security: Theories and Practice. TRUST 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2631. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36609-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36609-1_10

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00988-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36609-6

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