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International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science

SOFSEM 2000: SOFSEM 2000: Theory and Practice of Informatics pp 56–70Cite as

Algorithms for Rational Agents

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1963))

Abstract

Many recent applications of interest involve self-interested participants. As such participants, termed agents, may manipulate the algorithm for their own benefit, a new challenge emerges: The design of algorithms and protocols that perform well when the agents behave according to their own self-interest.

This led several researchers to consider computational models that are based on a sub-field of game-theory and micro-economics called mechanism design.

This paper introduces this topic mainly through examples. It demonstrates that in many cases selfishness can be satisfactorily overcome, surveys some of the recent trends in this area and presents new challenging problems.

The paper is mostly based on classic results from mechanism design as well as on recent work by the author and others.

This research was supported by grants from the Israeli academy of science and the Israeli ministry of science.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Amir Ronen

Authors
  1. Amir Ronen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Cybernetics, Czech Technical University, Karlovo nám. 13, 121 35, Prague, Czech Republic

    Václav Hlaváč

  2. Information Technology Department, CLRC RAL, Chilton, Didcot, Oxfordshire, UK

    Keith G. Jeffery

  3. Insitute of Computer Science, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Pod vodárenskou věží 2, 182 07, Prague, Czech Republic

    Jiří Wiedermann

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Ronen, A. (2000). Algorithms for Rational Agents. In: Hlaváč, V., Jeffery, K.G., Wiedermann, J. (eds) SOFSEM 2000: Theory and Practice of Informatics. SOFSEM 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1963. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44411-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44411-4_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41348-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44411-4

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