Abstract
Cognitive technologies, ancient and modern, are best understood (I suggest) as deep and integral parts of the problem-solving systems we identify as human intelligence. They are best seen as proper parts of the computational apparatus that constitutes our minds. Understanding what is distinctive about human reason thus involves understanding the complementary contributions of both biology and (broadly speaking) technology, as well as the dense, reciprocal patterns of causal and co-evolutionary influence that run between them.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Beer, R. (1995). “A Dynamical Systems Perspective Perspective on Agent-Environment Interaction.” Artificial Intelligence 72: 173–215.
Brooks, R. (1991). “Intelligence without representation.” Artificial Intelligence 47: 139–159.
Chambers D, and Reisberg, D (1989)” Can Mental Images Be Ambiguous?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 317–328.
Chenn, A. (1997). Development of the Cerebral Cortex in W. Cowan, T. Jessel and S. Ziputsky (eds) Molecular and Cellular Approaches to Neural Development Oxford, England, Oxford University Press 440–473.
Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Parallel Distributed Processing. Cambridge, MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1998). Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation. Language and Thought. J. Boucher and P. Carruthers. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Clark, A (1999). “An Embodied Cognitive Science?” Trends In Cognitive Sciences 3:9:1999: 345–351.
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58: 7–19.
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype (New York: Oxford University Press).
Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of Minds. New York, Basic Books.
Griffiths, P.E. and K. Stotz (2000). How the mind grows: A developmental perspective on the biology of cognition. Synthese 122(1–2): 29–51.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition In The Wild Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Norman, D. (1999). The Invisible Computer Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the Mind Works New York, Norton.
Quartz, S. (1999). The Constructivist Brain Trends In Cognitive Science 3:2: 48–57.
Quartz, S. and Sejnowski, T (1997). The Neural Basis of Cognitive Development: A Constructivist Manifesto Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:537–596.
Rumelhart, D. Smolensky, P. McClelland, D. and Hinton, G. (1986). Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models, in Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Micro structure of Cognition, vol 2, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA p. 7–57.
Schlagger, B. and O’Leary, D. (1991). Potential of Visual Cortex to Develop an Array of Functional Units Unique to Somatosensory Cortex Science 252 1556–1560.
VanLeeuwen, C, Verstijnen, I. and Hekkert, P. (1999). Common unconscious dynamics underlie common conscious effects: a case study in the interactive nature of perception and creation. In S. Jordan (ed) Modeling Consciousness Across the Disciplines Lanhan, MD, University Press of America.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Clark, A. (2001). Natural-Born Cyborgs?. In: Beynon, M., Nehaniv, C.L., Dautenhahn, K. (eds) Cognitive Technology: Instruments of Mind. CT 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2117. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44617-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44617-6_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42406-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44617-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive