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International Computing and Combinatorics Conference

COCOON 2003: Computing and Combinatorics pp 435–444Cite as

Majority Equilibrium for Public Facility Allocation

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2697))

Abstract

In this work, we consider the public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process uner the majority rule. A locations of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have be closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the general problem, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is consider part of the input size, is NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Peking

    Lihua Chen

  2. Department of Computer science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Xiaotie Deng

  3. Department of Mathematics, Ocean University of China, China

    Qizhi Fang

  4. Institute of Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China

    Feng Tian

Authors
  1. Lihua Chen
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  2. Xiaotie Deng
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  3. Qizhi Fang
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  4. Feng Tian
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Austin, One University Station, C0500, Austin, TX, 78712, USA

    Tandy Warnow

  2. Department of Computer Science, Montana State University, EPS 357, Bozeman, MT, 59717, USA

    Binhai Zhu

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, L., Deng, X., Fang, Q., Tian, F. (2003). Majority Equilibrium for Public Facility Allocation. In: Warnow, T., Zhu, B. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2697. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45071-8_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45071-8_44

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40534-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45071-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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