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An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1894))

Abstract

Auctions on the Internet have become especially popular in Electronic Commerce. Amongthe various studies on the Internet auctions, those on combinatorial auctions have lately attracted considerable attention. Combinatorial auctions simultaneously sell multiple items with interdependent values and allow the bidders to bid on any combination of items. Therefore, they tend to increase the buyers’ utilities and the seller’s revenue.

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References

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Sakurai, Y., Yokoo, M., Kamei, K. (2000). An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. In: Dechter, R. (eds) Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming – CP 2000. CP 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1894. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45349-0_47

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45349-0_47

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41053-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45349-9

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