Abstract
The Pintsov-Vanstone signature scheme with partial message recovery (PVSSR) is a signature scheme with low message expansion (overhead) and variable length recoverable and non-recoverable message parts. The scheme uses three cryptographic primitives: a symmetric cipher, hash function and an elliptic curve group. We give three security proofs for PVSSR in this paper. Each proof makes a concrete and necessary assumption about one primitive, and models the other two primitives by idealizations. Thus, PVSSR with a strong cipher may offer greater security than other common variants of ElGamal signatures.
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Brown, D.R.L., Johnson, D.B. (2001). Formal Security Proofs for a Signature Scheme with Partial Message Recovery. In: Naccache, D. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2001. CT-RSA 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2020. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45353-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45353-9_11
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