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Declarative Specification and Solution of Combinatorial Auctions Using Logic Programming

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Logic Programming and Nonmotonic Reasoning (LPNMR 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2173))

Abstract

In a combinatorial auction problem bidders are allowed to bid on a bundle of items. The auctioneer has to select a subset of the bids so as to maximize the price it gets, and of course making sure that it does not accept multiple bids that have the same item as each item can be sold only once. In this paper we show how the combinatorial auction problem and many of its extensions can be expressed in logic programming based systems such as Smodels and dlv. We propose this as an alternative to the standard syntax specific specialized implementations that are much harder to modify and extend when faced with generalizations and additional constraints.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Sc. and Engg., Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona, 85287

    Chitta Baral & Cenk Uyan

Authors
  1. Chitta Baral
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  2. Cenk Uyan
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informationssysteme, Vienna University of Technology, 1040, Wien, Austria

    Thomas Eiter

  2. Institut für Informationssysteme, Vienna University of Technology, 1040, Wien, Austria

    Wolfgang Faber

  3. Department of Computer Science Lexington, University of Kentucky, KY, 40506-0046, USA

    Miros law Truszczyński

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Baral, C., Uyan, C. (2001). Declarative Specification and Solution of Combinatorial Auctions Using Logic Programming. In: Eiter, T., Faber, W., Truszczyński, M.l. (eds) Logic Programming and Nonmotonic Reasoning. LPNMR 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2173. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45402-0_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45402-0_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42593-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45402-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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