Skip to main content

Information Structure and Logical Design of Social Rules

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Computer Aided Systems Theory — EUROCAST 2001 (EUROCAST 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2178))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 428 Accesses

Abstract

Apart from purely theoretical approaches(mainly in microeconomics), there seem to be not a lot of studies which employ computational environment to examine/explain sociological/ethical process of building informal institution in a society, or statement like “people should behave moralistically”. In this study I introduce an “agent based model” and then present an idea to examine/explain the sociological/ethical processes and statements using it. I make a trial to set a situation in which the agents can be defined to be “moralistic”, using the notion of games and information structure. Some meaningful results on the formalisation are shown.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Danielson, P.: Artificial Morality. Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games. Routledge, London New York (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Mérő, L.: Kramer, D. (eds.): Moral Calculations. Game Theory, Logic, and Human Frailty. Copernicus Springer-Verlag, New York (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Aumann, R.J.: Rationality and Bounded Rationality. Nancy Schwartz Lecture, Kellogg Foundation (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Aumann, R.J.: Backwards Induction and Common Knowledge Rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 8. (1997), 6–19

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Waldrop, M. Mitchell: Complexity. The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order & Chaos. Simon & Schuster(1992)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Axelrod, R.: Artificial Intelligence and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Discussion Paper 120, Institute of Public Policy Studies. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.(1978)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Axelrod, R.: The Complexity of Cooperation, Agent-based Models of Competition and Collaboration, Princeton Studies in Complexity. Princeton University Press, New Jersey (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Geanacoplos, J.: Common Knowledge. In: Aumann, R, Hart, S (eds.): Handbook of Game Theory. Elsevier, Leiden (1994) 1438–1496

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Shimogawa, T. (2001). Information Structure and Logical Design of Social Rules. In: Moreno-Díaz, R., Buchberger, B., Luis Freire, J. (eds) Computer Aided Systems Theory — EUROCAST 2001. EUROCAST 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45654-6_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45654-6_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42959-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45654-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics