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Symbolic Semantics and Analysis for Crypto-CCS with (Almost) Generic Inference Systems

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Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2002 (MFCS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2420))

Abstract

Crypto-CCS is a formal description language for distributed protocols which is suitable to abstractly model the cryptographic ones. Indeed, this language adopts a message-manipulating rule which may be used to mimic some features of cryptographic functions. We equip the Crypto-CCS calculus with a symbolic operational semantics. Moreover, we provide a mechanized method to analyze the security properties of cryptographic protocols (with finite behaviour), symbolically. Our work extends the previous one on symbolic verification techniques for cryptographic protocols modeled with process algebras since it deals with (almost) generic inference systems instead of fixed ones.

Work partially supported by Microsoft Research Europe (Cambridge); by MIUR project “MEFISTO”; by MIUR project “Tecniche e strumenti software per l’analisi della sicurezza delle comunicazioni in applicazioni telematiche di interesse economico e sociale”; by CNR project “Strumenti, ambienti ed applicazioni innovative per la società dell’informazione” and finally by CSP with the project “SeTAPS”.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Informatica e Telematica, C.N.R., Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

Authors
  1. Fabio Martinelli
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Informatics, Warsaw University, ul. Banacha 2, 02-097, Warszawa, Poland

    Krzysztof Diks  & Wojciech Rytter  & 

  2. Department of Computer Science, Liverpool University, Peach Street, Liverpool, L69 7ZF, UK

    Wojciech Rytter

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Martinelli, F. (2002). Symbolic Semantics and Analysis for Crypto-CCS with (Almost) Generic Inference Systems. In: Diks, K., Rytter, W. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2002. MFCS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2420. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45687-2_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45687-2_43

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44040-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45687-2

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