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Known Plaintext Correlation Attack against RC5

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Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002 (CT-RSA 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2271))

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Abstract

We investigate a known plaintext attack on RC5 based on correlations. Compared with the best previous known-plaintext attack on RC5-32, a linear cryptanalysis by Borst, Preneel, and Vandewalle, our attack applies to a larger number of rounds. RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26.14r+2.27 plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) with 263.67 plaintexts with a probability of 90%. With a success probability of 30%, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 halfrounds by using 263.07 plaintexts.

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Miyaji, A., Nonaka, M., Takii, Y. (2002). Known Plaintext Correlation Attack against RC5. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002. CT-RSA 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43224-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45760-2

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