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A Second-Order DPA Attack Breaks a Window-Method Based Countermeasure against Side Channel Attacks

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Information Security (ISC 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2433))

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Abstract

Möller proposed a countermeasure using window method against side channel attacks. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. In this paper, we show Möller's countermeasure is vulnerable to a second-order differential power analysis attack. A side channel attackis an attackthat takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. An nth-order differential power analysis attackis the side channel attack which uses n different leaked data that correspond to n different intermediate values during the execution. Our proposed attackagainst Möller's countermeasure finds out the use of same elliptic points, and restricts candidates of the secret scalar value. In these circumstances, the attack completely detects the scalar value using Baby-Step-Giant-Step method as a direct- computational attack. For a 160-bit scalar value, the proposed attack restricts the number of candidates of the scalar to a 45-bit integer, and the direct-computational attackcan actually detect the scalar value. Besides, we improve Möller's countermeasure to prevent the proposed attack. We compare the original method and improved countermeasure in terms of the computational intractability and the computational cost of the scalar multiplication.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Systems Development Laboratory, Hitachi, Ltd., 292, Yoshida-cho, Totsuka-ku, 244-0817, Yokohama, Japan

    Katsuyuki Okeya

  2. Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, 6-10-1, Hakozaki, Higashi-ku, 812-8581, Fukuoka, Japan

    Kouichi Sakurai

Authors
  1. Katsuyuki Okeya
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  2. Kouichi Sakurai
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer Science, Northeastern University, 02115, Boston, MA, USA

    Agnes Hui Chan

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, 20742, College Park, MD, USA

    Virgil Gligor

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Okeya, K., Sakurai, K. (2002). A Second-Order DPA Attack Breaks a Window-Method Based Countermeasure against Side Channel Attacks. In: Chan, A.H., Gligor, V. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2433. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_30

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44270-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45811-1

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