A NEW PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION SCHEME

He Jingmin and Lu Kaicheng

Dept. of Computer Science, Tsinghua University

Beijing, People's Republic of China

Abstract. In this paper we present a new probabilistic public key cryptosystem. The system is polynomially secure. Furthermore, it is highly efficient in that it's message expansion is $1+(k-1)/1$, where k is the security parameter and 1 the length of the encrypted message. Finally, the system can be used to sign signatures.

1. Introduction

The most important problem in modern cryptography is how to encrypt messages in a secure and efficient way. Here two things are of equal importance: security and efficiency. Up to now three different notions of security have been proposed: Goldwasser and Micali's polynomial security, semantic security [1], and Y-security introduced by Yao [2]. Micali et al([3]) have pointed out that these three notions are essentially equivalent. In this paper we'll adopt the notion of polynomial security. As to the efficiency, it usually means the encrypting and decrypting time and the message expansion.

The earliest public key cryptosystem is RSA [4]. RSA is highly efficient be-cause it's message expansion is about one (the possibely least value). However, it's security remains to be proven. Actually RSA is a deterministic cryptosystem and can't be secure according to [1]. In another direction, Goldwasser and Micali [1] presented the first probabilistic encryption scheme whose polynomial security is rigorously proven. But their scheme is not efficient at all. They encrypt every bit of the message independently, so the message expansion is k (the security parameter) and this makes the scheme totally unvalued in practice.

In this paper we concern both security and efficiency. We present a new "random iterative encryption scheme" which can achieve both polynomial security and high efficiency. The idea is simple: we randomly and iteratively encrypt the plaintext bit by bit. In this way we can get a secure public key cryptosystem with a low message expansion of $1+(k-1)/1$, where 1 is the length of the plaintext and k the security par-

ameter. The one more lucky thing is that the new scheme can be used to sign digital signatures, which seems impossible in the schemes of [1], [5] and [6].

Remark: Blum and Goldwasser have presented another secure probabilistic encryption method with a message expansion of $1+k/l$. Their method is similar to that of Blum et al.([5]), in which it exlusive-or the plaintext with a sequence of the same length generated by a pseudo-random number generator. For the details see [5] and [6].

2. Background

Let N denote the set of positive integers and $n \in N$. Let $Z_n^* = \{x \mid 1 \leq x < n$ and $(x,n) = 1\}$, $Z_n^1 = \{x \mid 1 \leq x < n$ and $(x/n)=1\}$, where (x/n) is the Jacobi symbol of x mod n. The symbol $|n|$ denotes the binary length of n.

Let Q_n be a predicate defined on Z_n^1 such that $Q_n(x)=1$ iff x is a quadratic residue mod n. Let H_k denote the set of "hard composite integers", i.e., $H_k=\{n \mid n=pq$, where p and q are distinct primes such that $|p|=|q|=k.\}$.

The security of our scheme is based on the quadratic residuosity assumption (QRA). From QRA Goldwasser and Micali have proven the following.

Lemma 1 ([1]). Under QRA, the predicate Q_n defined on Z_n^1 is unappoximable by any circuit of polynomial size even if some quadratic nonresidue mod n are known. (Recall that a circuit C ϵ-approximates a predicate $Q:B \to \{0,1\}$ if $C(x)=Q(x)$ for at least a fraction $1/2+\epsilon$ of the $x \in B$.)

Let $J_n=\{x \mid 1 \leq x < n/2$ and $(x/n)=1\}$. Let QR_n denote the set of quadratic residues mod n. It is easy to prove the following

Lemma 2. Let $n=pq$ where p and q are distinct primes such that $p=q=3 \mod 4$. Then each $z \in QR_n$ has exactly one square root that is in J_n and we denote this root by $sqr(z)$.

We point out that Lemma 1 will still hold when Q_n defined on Z_n^1 is restricted to J_n, and we still call the result Lemma 1.

3. The New Encryption Scheme

Let $n=pq$ as in Lemma 2. Let y be a quadratic nonresidue mod n. Now we introduce a function E_n as follows:

$$E_n: \quad J_n \times \{0,1\} \longrightarrow J_n \times \{0,1\}$$

$$E_n(x,0)=(\ x^2 \mod n,\ 0\ ) \qquad \text{if } x^2 \mod n < n/2,$$
$$=(-x^2 \mod n,\ 1) \qquad \text{otherwise.}$$

$$E_n(x,1)=(\ x^2 y \mod n,\ 0) \qquad \text{if } x^2 y \mod n < n/2,$$
$$=(-x^2 y \mod n,\ 1) \qquad \text{otherwise.}$$

From Lemma 2 we know that E_n is invertible. The inverse of E_n is denoted by D_n and can be specified as follows:

$$D_n: J_n \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow J_n \times \{0,1\}$$

$$D_n(z,j) = (\text{ sqr}(z), 0) \quad \text{if } j=0 \text{ and } z \in QR.$$
$$= (\text{ sqr}(zy^{-1}), 1) \quad \text{if } j=1 \text{ and } z \notin QR.$$
$$= (\text{ sqr}(-zy^{-1}), 1) \quad \text{if } j=1 \text{ and } z \notin QR.$$
$$= (\text{ sqr}(-z), 0) \quad \text{if } j=1 \text{ and } z \notin QR.$$

For convenience we denote the first and second components of $E_n(x,i)$ by $E_n^1(x,i)$ and $E_n^2(x,i)$ respectively.

For any positive integer 1, E_n can be generalized as follows:

$$E_n: J_n \times \{0,1\}^1 \longrightarrow J_n \times \{0,1\}^1$$
$$E_n(x,m_1 \cdots m_1) = (x_1, \ b_1 \cdots b_1)$$

where

$$x_0 = x,$$
$$x_i = E_n^1(x_{i-1}, \ m_i),$$
$$b_i = E_n(x_{i-1}, \ m_i),$$
$$i = 1,2,\ldots,1.$$

The generalized E_n is also invertible and it's inverse is still denoted by D_n.

Now let k (an even number) be the security parameter. The new probabilistic pub-lic key cryptosystem works as follows:

(1) it randomly selects two distinct primes p and q such that $p = q = 3 \mod 4$ and $|p| = |q| = k/2$,

(2) sets $n = pq$,

(3) picks y, a quadratic nonresidue mod n, and finally,

(4) outputs $\{n,y\}$ and $\{p,q\}$.

Some user, say A, publicizes the pair $\{n, y\}$ and keeps secret the pair $\{p,q\}$.

Encryption: Suppose some user B want to send a binary message $m = m_1 \cdots m_1$ to user A. Then he encrypts m as follows:

(1) Randomly selects an $x \in J_n$ and sets $z = x$.

(2) Performs step (3) for $i = 1,2,\ldots,1$.

(3) $(z,b_i) := E_n(z,m_i)$.

(4) Sends A the ciphertext $E_n(x,m) = (z,b_1 \cdots b_1)$.

Encrypting an 1-bit long message m takes $O(1k^2)$ time, and m is transformed into an $(1+k-1)$-bit long ciphertext. So the message expansion is $1+(k-1)/1$ which is much less than k (the message expansion of Goldwasser and Micali's scheme).

Decryption: Upon receiving the ciphertext $(z,b_1 \cdots b_1)$, user A decrypts it as follows:

(1) Performs step (2) for $i = 1,1-1,\ldots,1$.

(2) $(z,m_i) := D_n(z,b_i)$.

(3) Gets the message $m = m_1 \cdots m_1$.

Recovering m ($|m| = 1$) from it's ciphertext takes $O(1k^3)$ time.

Using the proof techniques in [3] and [6], we can prove the following

Theorem. The cryptosystem introduced above is polynomially secure.

Proof. The proof is tedious long and omitted here.

4. Applications

To sign a message m, we randomly select an $x \in J_n$ and forms
$$S(m) = (\ m,\ D_n(x,m)\ )$$
S(m) will be the signature of m. Of course this simple signature is not strong. By computing $E_n(z,b)=(x,m)$, the forger can easily forge the signature of an (unpredictable) message m. This is the so-called "chosen signature attack" and can be prevented in several ways. One way is as follows: randomly select $x,y \in J_n$, $x \neq y$, and let $S(m)=(m, D_n(x,m), D_n(y,m))$. This time forging the signature of even an unpredictable message m requires finding $w,z \in J_n$, $b,b' \in \{0,1\}^*$, such that $E_n(w,b)=E_n(z,b')$, and this seems impossible.

Note that in the above mentioned signature scheme, the signature of $m_1 \ldots m_i$ or $m_i \ldots m_l$ for any i $(1 \leq i \leq l)$ can be easily obtained when the signature of $m_1 \ldots m_l$ is known. But we may avoid this danger by letting, for example,
$$S(m_1 \ldots m_l)=(m_1 \ldots m_l,\ D_n(x,m_1 \ldots m_l),\ D_n(y,\ m_{l/2} \ldots m_l\ m_1 \ldots m_{l/2+1}\ )\ ).$$
Clearly various signature schemes can be devised based on our new public key cryptosystem. We leave the open problem of implementing a concrete signature scheme, together with a rigorous security proof.

References

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