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(M + 1)st-Price Auction Protocol

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Financial Cryptography (FC 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2339))

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Abstract

This paper presents a new protocol for M + 1st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M + 1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M + 1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners’ bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Tokai University, 1117 Kitakaname, Hiratsuka, Kanagawa, 259-1292, Japan

    Hiroaki Kikuchi

Authors
  1. Hiroaki Kikuchi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 20375, USA

    Paul Syverson

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kikuchi, H. (2002). (M + 1)st-Price Auction Protocol. In: Syverson, P. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2339. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46088-8_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46088-8_27

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44079-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46088-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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