Abstract
A model of BDI-agent in game-theoretic framework is presented. The desire is represented as agent’s goal to achieve a maximum level of utility. A reasoning process based on agent’s rational behavior is proposed. This process determines agent’s intention. It is also shown how to use the backward induction consistently with the assumption of the common knowledge of rationality.
Our thanks are due to four anonymous referees for important remarks and suggestions. The work was supported by KBN Grant 8T11C 03110
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Ambroszkiewicz, S., Komar, J. (1999). A Model of BDI-Agent in Game-Theoretic Framework. In: Meyer, JJ.C., Schobbens, PY. (eds) Formal Models of Agents. ModelAge 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46581-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46581-2_2
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