Abstract
Different cryptographic protocols have been formally proved by different re- searchers. But in the case of secret sharing (SS) protocol there is no attempt yet of proving. We show with an example of SS modeling, how SS protocol can be formally verified using Coq, a general theorem prover. In modeling our SS protocol we follow the approach of Dominique. The approach is based on the use of state-based general purpose formal methods , and on a clear separation between the modeling of reliable agents and that of intruders. The formaliza- tion for the intruder knowledge, axioms for manipulating them, as well as the protocol description can be transposed quite directly using Coq.
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Dominique Bolignano. An approach to the formal verification of cryptographic protocols. In 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, March 1996.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Meng Yew, K., Zahidur Rahman, M., Lee, S.P. (1999). Formal Verification of Secret Sharing Protocol Using Coq. In: Thiagarajan, P.S., Yap, R. (eds) Advances in Computing Science — ASIAN’99. ASIAN 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1742. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46674-6_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46674-6_36
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