Abstract
We give a general introduction to cryptographic protocols and the kinds of attacks to which they are susceptible. We then present a framework based on linear logic programming for analyzing authentication protocols and show how various notions of attack are expressed in this framework.
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Compton, K.J., Dexter, S. (1999). Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Protocols. In: Wiedermann, J., van Emde Boas, P., Nielsen, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1644. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48523-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48523-6_3
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