Abstract
The formal verification of security protocols is one of the successful applications of automated reasoning1. Techniques based on belief logics, model checking, and theorem proving have been successful in determining strengths and weaknesses of many protocols, some of which have been even fielded before being discovered badly wrong.
This tutorial presents the problems to the “security illiterate”, explaining aims, objectives and tools of this application of automated reasoning.
Indeed, the proposal to use tableaux for security verification dates back to 1983 [11].
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Massacci, F. (1999). Automated Reasoning and the Verification of Security Protocols. In: Murray, N.V. (eds) Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods. TABLEAUX 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1617. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48754-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48754-9_6
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